







"I certainly would like Your Honor to put that conviction in
quotation marks."
-A defendant's protest against the use of an allegedly
unfair prior Mexican conviction to enhance his sen-
tence.1
INTRODUCTION
"[T]he whole purpose of our criminal justice system is to
make some effort to prevent people from repeating criminal activi-
ty."2 The Missouri trial judge who made this point to a recidivist
defendant may have exaggerated, but concern about the amount of
crime committed by repeat offenders has recently prompted calls
for stricter recidivist statutes.3 Every state currently authorizes in-
creased punishment for repeat offenders4 under statutes varying in
scope,' harshness,6 and degree of discretion granted to sentencing
1. United States v. Moskovits, 784 F. Supp. 183, 185 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
2. Zamorano v. State, 793 S.W.2d 894, 898 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (quoting from the
trial record).
3. Jane Gross, Drive' to Keep Repeat Felons in Prison Gains in California, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 26, 1993, at Al.
4. See infra notes 29-31.
5. For example, some statutes enhance sentences based on previous convictions only
for certain offenses. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-407 (1990) (extending term by
three years for each prior conviction when current and prior convictions are for felony
sexual offenses); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-297.1 (Michie Supp. 1994) (enhancing sentences
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judges! Generally, courts apply "habitual offender" laws only
when prosecutors choose to invoke them, whereas "three-time
loser" statutes8 are mandatory in their application. 9 As the move-
ment to enact tougher crime laws grows," these laws are likely to
become broader and harsher, and more of them may become
mandatory in their application.
Many criminals in America have committed crimes in other
countries. Such criminals include not only Americans who have
broken foreign" laws while traveling abroad but also foreign
criminals who have come to the United States. Jan Gramo, for
of defendants convicted of acts of violence if defendants have previous convictions for
acts of violence). Other statutes are broader, applying to all felonies, e.g., N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-18-17 (Michie 1978), or even all offenses, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-104
(1989).
6. In Alabama, for example, a defendant with three previous felony convictions of
any type must be sentenced to prison for life without parole if convicted of a felony of
the most serious grade. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-9(c)(3) (1982). In Alaska, on the other
hand, the number of previous felony convictions corresponds to an additional term of
years, the number of which is dependent on the base offense. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125
(1990).
7. Some statutes provide that a sentencing judge may increase a sentence because
of prior convictions, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4504(a) (Supp. 1993), while others man-
date enhancement, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 643B (1992).
8. See Gross, supra note 3, at Al.
9. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.94A.120(4), .030(25) (West Supp. 1994).
10. Washington state residents recently approved a harsh three-time loser law, WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.120, by a wide margin. Mark Trumbull, Washington State: Na-
tional Lab on Crime, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 17, 1993, at 3. Grassroots efforts to
pressure other state legislatures into passing three-time loser laws are gaining momentum,
fueled by widely publicized incidents in which experienced criminals have killed helpless
victims. For example, in California recently, 18-year-old Kimber Reynolds was killed as
she walked out of a restaurant by a criminal with a long record. Gross, supra note 3, at
Al. In another California murder, 12-year-old Polly Klaas was abducted from a slumber
party and killed by a twice-convicted kidnapper who had been released early from prison
after both convictions. Sheryl McCarthy, 3-Strike Law Strikes Out, NEWSDAY, Mar. 7,
1994, at 8; Richard Price, Police Face Criticism in Klaas Death, USA TODAY, Dec. 7,
1993, at 1A. California governor Pete Wilson has publicly supported life sentences for
two-time offenders with respect to violent sex crimes, calling them a "fitting memorial for
Polly Klaas." Id.
President Clinton also has expressed support for stricter laws, hoping to send the
following message to criminals: "When you commit a third violent crime, you will be put
away, and put away for good. Three strikes, and you are out." President Bill Clinton,
Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 25,
1994), 30 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 148, 155 (Jan. 31, 1994); see also Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322.
11. Throughout this Note, "foreign" means "of or from a country other than the
United States."
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example, entered the United States illegally 2 and embarked on a
burglary spree.13 Before coming to America, the 55-year-old had
twenty-eight felony convictions "from all over the world," includ-
ing Poland, Germany, and Sweden. 4 The average criminal may
not be as well-traveled as Gramo, but courts should be aware that
the criminal records of many defendants are not limited to one
country.
The problem of how to treat prior foreign convictions has
always existed in states with recidivist statutes that do not directly
address the issue, but with increasing "international intercourse,""5
it likely will grow in significance.16 Courts have been confronted
with the problem since at least 1855, when a judge acknowledged
the presence of Canadian fugitives in New York."7 Yet no con-
sistent doctrine for analyzing foreign convictions in this context
exists. This deficiency may be due to the scarcity of American
cases addressing the issue. 8 The infrequent use prosecutors make
of foreign convictions as predicate offenses for recidivist statutes is
12. People v. Gramo, 623 N.E.2d 926, 934 (Il1. App. Ct. 1993).
13. Id. at 929-31.
14. Id. at 931, 934. An investigator discovered these convictions by using Gramo's
fingerprints to get information through the International Criminal Police Organization
(Interpol). Id. at 931. The United States has played a more active role in Interpol in
recent years, but it has not progressed as far as European countries in developing its in-
ternational law enforcement relations. Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Role of the United States
in the International Enforcement of Criminal Law, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 37, 37-38 (1990).
Gramo's "miserable record" did catch up with him; the court imposed consecutive
sentences for his burglary convictions under ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 730, para. 5/5-8-4(b)
(Smith-Hurd 1992), which allows judges to impose consecutive rather than concurrent
sentences for defendants whose "history and character" are such that the public requires
special protection from them. Gramo, 623 N.E.2d at 934-35. Gramo was not sentenced
under a repeat offender statute because the Illinois statute is limited to prior felonies
within the state. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 730, para. 5/5-5-3(c)(8) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994).
15. BRANIMIR M. JANKOVIt, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 115 (1984); see also
Tahirih V. Lee & Joshua Searle-White, Prisoners Dilemma Meets Glasnost. A Compara-
tive Advantage Solution to the United States Prison Crisis, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 25, 25
(1991) ("[The world is growing more interdependent and . . . nations function as co-
dependents and are profoundly connected.").
16. See Nadelmann, supra note 14, at 37 (noting "the growing internationalization of
law enforcement").
17. People v. Casar, 1 Parker's Crim. Rep. 645, 648 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855). The court
observed that the reason the legislature had extended the New York statute enhancing
sentences for second offenders to include convictions in foreign countries was the state's
proximity to Canada. Id.
18. See A. Kenneth Pye, The Effect of Foreign Criminal Judgments in the United
States, 32 UMKC L. REV. 114, 128 (1964). Surprisingly, the number of cases has re-
mained low in the 30 years since Pye commented on their scarcity.
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probably due more to a lack of easy access to foreign criminal
records than to prosecutorial discretion.' 9
Concern about the fairness of criminal justice in other coun-
tries has caused some reluctance among courts to acknowledge
foreign convictions.0 Circumspection is laudable when appropri-
ate, but courts should recognize that even convictions under sys-
tems without procedural protections mirroring those in the United
States often are based on underlying substantive crimes that
should be included in the calculus of sentencing repeat offenders,
unless otherwise specified by the state legislature. Because the
government is not required to prove factors that judges consider
when sentencing beyond a reasonable doubt,2 courts should be
more inclusive in their treatment of foreign convictions. The U.S.
Constitution is silent as to what may or should be considered at
sentencingYz The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has authorized
very broad discretion. Essentially, sentences should be based on
"the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life
and characteristics." 4 Surely, foreign convictions constitute rele-
vant information.'
Part I of this Note reviews how courts have treated foreign
convictions, especially in the context of recidivist statutes.26 The
19. See supra note 14.
20. See, e.g., People v. Braithwaite, 240 N.W.2d 293 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976); infra text
accompanying notes 85-88.
21. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 (1986).
22. MARK H. MOORE ET AL., DANGEROUS OFFENDERS 107 (1984). It is unconstitu-
tional, however, to consider a defendant's race, Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885
(1983), or abstract beliefs, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2200 (1993).
23. See, e.g., Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937) ("For the
determination of sentences, justice generally requires consideration of more than the
particular acts by which the crime was committed .... "). The Court appears historically
opposed to retribution, at least as a sole rationale, having held that "the punishment
should fit the offender and not merely the crime." Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,
247 (1949).
24. Williams, 337 U.S. at 247. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit has held that sentencing judges can consider the results of previous efforts to
rehabilitate the defendant. United States v. Bradley, 812 F.2d 774, 781 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 832 (1987).
25. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which base sentences on various factors par-
ticular to the individual and to the crime, including a criminal history "score," exclude
foreign convictions from the criminal history score but allow them to justify departures
from the range of punishment otherwise dictated. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDE-
LINES MANUAL §§ 4A1.2(h), 4A1.3(a) (1991).
26. Although this Note focuses on repeat offender statutes, the dearth of cases di-
rectly on point necessitates the analysis of decisions of both federal and state courts ad-
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treatment of foreign convictions by some state legislatures and the
silence of others27 also are considered. Part II discusses the policy
reasons to count such convictions as predicates for enhanced pen-
alties and stresses that counting foreign convictions results in the
equal treatment of defendants whose prior crimes were in the
United States and defendants with foreign criminal records. Part
III explores the constitutional limits on the use of such convictions.
Part IV proposes a standard for courts to use in evaluating
foreign convictions when considering whether they should be in-
cluded as predicate offenses in prosecutions under repeat offender
statutes that do not prohibit such inclusion. It argues that the
touchstone should be the reliability of the conviction. That is,
courts should evaluate whether the foreign conviction is reliable
evidence that the crime underlying the conviction actually oc-
curred. For example, foreign convictions based on forced confes-
sions should be ignored because of the doubt cast on the determi-
nation of guilt in such a situation; those based on physical evi-
dence obtained by means that would be unconstitutional in the
United States, however, should be counted. Currently, defendants
whose prior crimes have been confined to the United States are
more likely to be sentenced under recidivist statutes than defen-
dants with foreign criminal records, because courts tend not to
accord foreign judgments the respect they deserve.
I. JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE TREATMENT
OF FOREIGN CONVICTIONS
A. Interpretations of Statutory Language
The current s treatment of foreign convictions in repeat of-
dressing the use of foreign convictions for other purposes as well, such as impeaching a
witness or justifying a deportation.
27. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines also address this issue. See infra notes 32-33
and accompanying text.
28. In most repeat offender laws, the treatment of foreign convictions has not
changed recently with regard to what jurisdictions convictions may be from to be counted
as predicates for sentence enhancement. Perhaps because of its convenient location as a
port of entry into the United States, Florida recently broadened its habitual offender act
to encompass prior felony convictions from "the District of Columbia . . . any possession
or territory [of the United States], or any foreign jurisdiction .... " Act of July 5, 1989,
ch. 89-280, sec. 1, § 775.084(1)(c), 1989 Fla. Laws ch. 89-280 (codified as amended at
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.084(1)(c) (West 1992)). Previously, only convictions from within
the United States had been counted. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775,084(1)(c) (West 1987)
(amended 1989).
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fender statutes varies widely: eight states explicitly authorize their
consideration,29 twenty states implicitly disallow it,"° and the re-
maining twenty-two states and the District of Columbia have am-
biguously worded statutes.31 Under the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, a foreign conviction does not contribute to a defendant's
criminal history "score"32 but may be used as a factor to justify
departure from the otherwise mandated range of punishment.33
New York, oddly, amended its original repeat offender statute, Act of Apr. 15,
1823, ch. CLX, § VI, 1823 N.Y. Laws 179, to include foreign countries 150 years ago, see
People v. Caesar, 1 Parker's Crim. Rep. 645, 648 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855), only to revert to
the ambiguous language "any other jurisdiction" in 1973. Act of May 8, 1973, ch. 277,
sec. 9, § 70.06(1)(b)(i), 1973 N.Y. Laws 1070 (codified as amended at N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 70.06(1)(b)(i) (McKinney 1987)). The holding of People v. LeGrand, 439 N.Y.S.2d 695,
697 (App. Div. 1981), though, shows that this amendment did not affect how courts
interpret the statute. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
29. CAL. PENAL CODE § 668 (West 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.084(1)(c) (West
1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4504(a) to (c) (Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 15:529.1(A) (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244 cmt. II.B.501 (West Supp. 1993);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 54 (West 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-35-106(b)(5),
-107(b)(5), -108(b)(5) (1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 11 (1974).
30. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-40(a) (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 4214 (Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-7 (1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 730,
para. 5/5-5-3(c)(8) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 902.8 (West 1994); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 362(3-A) (West Supp. 1993); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279,
§ 25 (Law. Co-op. 1992); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-81 (Supp. 1993); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 29-2221(1) (1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-17(A) (Michie Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-7.1 (1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-09(1)(c) (Supp. 1993); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2929.11(B)(1)(b)-(3)(b) (Baldwin 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.725(3)-(4)
(1990); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9714(b)(1) (1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-21(A)
(Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-45(1)(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993); S.D. CODI-
FrED LAWS ANN. § 22-7-7 (1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-297.1(B) (Michie Supp. 1994);
W. VA. CODE § 61-11-18 (Supp. 1994).
31. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-9 (1982); ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.145(a)(2) (1989); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-604(N) (Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-503 (Michie 1993);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-13-101(1) to (2) (Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. §
22-104a(b)(1)(B) (1989); HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-662 (1994); IDAHO CODE § 19-2514
(1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8 (Bums 1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.080(2)
(Baldwin 1992); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 643B(c) (1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§
769.10-.12 (West Supp. 1994); MO. ANN. STAT. § 558.016 (Vernon Supp. 1994); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-18-501(1) (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.010 (Michie 1992); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:6(I)(c) (1986 & Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-4(c) (West
1982); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.06(1)(b)(i) (McKinney 1987); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §
12.42 (West 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-407 (1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9.94A.030(12)(a) (West Supp. 1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.62 (West 1982); WYO. STAT.
§ 6-10-201(a)(ii) (1988).
32. UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 4A1.2(h) (1991). Under the Guide-
lines, a defendant's score helps determine the appropriate sentence. Id. § 4A, introducto-
ry commentary.
33. Id. § 4A1.3(a). The discussion immediately following subsection 4A1.3(e) specifi-
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The statutes that do authorize the consideration of foreign
convictions use clear language to describe where predicate convic-
tions may originate, such as "any other state, government, country,
or jurisdiction, 34  "[any other state or] any foreign jurisdic-
tion,"35 or "[any other state or] foreign government., 36 The stat-
utes that appear to leave no room for foreign convictions use
language such as "this or any other state., 37 As a result, the
courts in states with this type of statute are bound to ignore for-
eign convictions for the purposes of repeat offender statutes, de-
spite the policy reasons for counting them. 8
Barring legislative clarification, courts in states with ambigu-
ously worded statutes have the opportunity to support the policy
of considering foreign convictions by reading them into the ambit
of the statutes.39 Ambiguous recidivist statutes use open-ended
phrases such as "another jurisdiction,"4 "any other jurisdic-
tion,"'" or "outside [this state]." 42  A globalist would have no
cally mentions, as an example of "when the criminal history category significantly under-
represents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history," "the case of a defendant
who ...had several previous foreign sentences for serious offenses." Id. § 4A1.3.
In United States v. Soliman, 889 F.2d 441, 444-45 (2d Cir. 1989), the Second Cir-
cuit upheld the propriety of the trial judge's consideration of the defendant's Italian drug
conviction and 10 years' experience drug trafficking in Europe when sentencing the de-
fendant to the maximum within the applicable range dictated by the Guidelines. But see
United States v. Azeem, 946 F.2d 13, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1991) (excluding defendant's drug
activities in Egypt from calculation of sentence).
34. CAL. PENAL CODE § 668 (West 1988).
35. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.084(1)(c) (West 1992).
36. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4504(a) to (c) (Supp. 1993).
37. E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2221(1) (1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-21(A)
(Supp. 1993). "State" can refer to a foreign government, but in the phrase "this or any
other state," the reference appears to be to one of the United States. See People v.
Kearney, 258 N.Y.S.2d 769, 773 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (acknowledging that although "state" can
refer to any government, it usually refers to a sister state); infra text accompanying notes
61-63.
38. See infra Part II.
39. A competing principle of interpretation is that unclear statutes should be con-
strued in favor of the defendant. See State v. Stover, 368 S.E.2d 308, 309 (W. Va. 1988);
see also State v. Wait, 509 P.2d 372, 375 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973) (ruling that statute with
purely penal purpose must be strictly construed), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 930 (1974).
40. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-4(c) (West 1982). The Model Penal Code also uses this
phrase. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.05(1) (1962). One commentator interpreted this lan-
guage to include foreign jurisdictions. Pye, supra note 18, at 131. He may have relied on
the first tentative draft of the Code, in which a comment refers to the consideration of
convictions "abroad." MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.05 cmt. 1 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1953).
Although the language in the Code is still the same ("another jurisdiction"), the word
"abroad" no longer appears in the comment. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.05 cmt. 1 (1962).
41. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-501(1) (1993).
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trouble interpreting such language as including foreign country ju-
risdictions, but courts suspicious of foreign criminal law systems4
likely would interpret these phrases as merely readable substitutes
for language such as "another state, the United States, a territory
of the United States or the commonwealth of Puerto Rico," 44
with no substantive difference.
Several legislatures have implicitly deemed ambiguous lan-
guage not to include foreign convictions.' For example, section
21-4504 of the Kansas Code once provided that a defendant could
be sentenced as a second offender after proof of a former con-
viction "out of the state. 46 In 1992, the statute was amended to
include convictions under the laws of "another state, the federal
government or a foreign government." 47 If any substantive change
was intended by the amendment, it must have been to expand the
range of convictions that could be used as predicates to sentence
enhancement.48 In other words, the legislature had read "out of
the state" to exclude foreign countries.
Conversely, when the Michigan legislature amended the state's
repeat offender statute, it changed a phrase explicitly including
foreign convictions ("any other state, government or country")49
to an ambiguous phrase ("outside this state").5 Because the pur-
pose of the amendment could not have been to clarify the statute,
it must have been to exclude foreign country convictions.5 One
can infer that the legislature deemed that "outside this state"
42. IDAHO CODE § 19-2514 (1987).
43. E.g., People v. Braithwaite, 240 N.W.2d 293 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976); see infra text
accompanying notes 85-88.
44. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-17(A)(2)(a) (Michie Supp. 1994).
45. The Minnesota legislature, on the other hand, has interpreted "out-of-state" to
include foreign countries in the state's sentencing guidelines. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244
cmt. II.B.501 (West Supp. 1994); see also Hill v. State, 483 N.W.2d 57, 60-61 (Minn.
1992) (approving the interpretation expressed in the comment to the guidelines).
46. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4504(e) (1988) (amended 1992).
47. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4504(a) (Supp. 1993).
48. Legislatures sometimes make amendments for clarification without intending sub-
stantive change, but the amendment by the Kansas legislature apparently was not cosmet-
ic: the language "out of the state" was left unamended in another subsection of the
statute. See id. § 21-4504(0.
49. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 769.10 (West 1968) (amended 1978).
50. MicH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 769.10(1) (West Supp. 1994).
51. The rewording might have been a legislative response to People v. Braithwaite,
240 N.W.2d 293 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976). See infra text accompanying note 91. But see
supra note 28 (discussing a New York court's interpretation of a similar change in statu-
tory language as not meaningful).
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excludes foreign countries, an interpretation that might seem rea-
sonable to one not looking beyond the bounds of the United
States. 2 The legislature might have assumed that unless specifi-
cally directed to do so, an American court would not consider
foreign convictions. Rhode Island's legislature was much clearer
when it amended the state's repeat offender statute in 1982, re-
moving the words "or country" from "any other state or coun-
try.9
53
Courts, on the other hand, have for the most part interpreted
ambiguous language as including foreign convictions for the pur-
pose of repeat offender statutes,54 although they often discount
foreign convictions because of concerns about foreign procedural
safeguards or the elements of foreign crimes." In Gwynne v.
State,6 an Alabama court held that the phrase "any felony"" in-
cluded Canadian convictions.5 Similarly, New York courts have
read a repeat offender statute encompassing prior felonies from
"any other jurisdiction, 59 as including foreign convictions.' Even
52. Actually, even within the United States, there may be a difference between
"outside this state" and "any other state," because the latter does not on its face include
federal convictions. Regulatory language in some states suggests, however, that even "out-
side this state" does not include federal jurisdictions. See, e.g., 204 PA. CODE § 303.7(d)
(1993) ("out-of-state or Federal").
53. Act of May 18, 1982, ch. 226, secs. 1-2, § 12-19-21(A), 1982 R.I. Pub. Laws
1100 (codified as amended at R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-21(A) (Supp. 1993)).
54. See, e.g., Zamorano v. State, 793 S.W.2d 894, 899 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (acknowl-
edging that foreign convictions could be used to enhance sentences under recidivist stat-
ute). The Missouri statute does not address the issue of where prior convictions may
originate. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 558.016 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
55. See infra text accompanying notes 98-99.
56. 499 So. 2d 802, 809 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986).
57. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-9 (1982). The court interpreted this statute in light of what
is now ALA. R. CRIM. P. 26.6(b)(3)(iv), which restates the scope as "[a]ny conviction in
any jurisdiction ...." Gwynne, 499 So. 2d at 809.
58. The court in Gwynne was influenced by a prior interpretation of the same words:
"[The language 'any felony' of § 13A-5-9] means that all felonies come within the pur-
view of the habitual offender statute, regardless of their origin." Watson v. State, 392 So.
2d 1274, 1279 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980) (considering a sister-state conviction) (emphasis
added), writ denied, 392 So. 2d 1280 (Ala. 1981); see Gwynne, 499 So. 2d at 809 (citing
Watson). This background suggests that without the word "regardless," the court might
not have been willing to embrace foreign country convictions within the statute.
59. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.04(1)(b)(i), 70.06(1)(b)(i) (McKinney 1987).
60. See, e.g., People v. LeGrand, 439 N.Y.S.2d 695 (App. Div. 1981) (implicitly ac-
knowledging that a Canadian conviction could be used under the statute although dis-
counting conviction because elements of foreign crime did not constitute a crime in New
York). For interpretations of different statutory language in New York, see also People
ex rel. LaTraverse v. Jackson, 132 N.Y.S.2d 115, 116 (App. Div. 1954); People ex rel.
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the phrase "any other state" was construed as including foreign
countries by the New York court in People v. Kearney." Admit-
ting that such language usually would refer only to sister states,
the court nonetheless reasoned that the word "state" can refer to
any government. The court found "no apparent basis for any...
distinction [between sister states and foreign governments] aside
from the greater difficulty [in evaluating foreign judgments]."'62
Kearney's expansive interpretation of a statute that on its face
appeared to exclude foreign convictions has been unparalleled; al-
though the case's value as precedent is limited due to the peculiar-
ity of the statutes that affected repeat offenders in New York at
the time,63 perhaps judges wishing to recognize foreign convic-
tions despite a lack of explicit statutory authorization will look to
Kearney for support.
In immigration cases, courts have been as willing to interpret
ambiguous statutes in favor of considering foreign judgments as
they have been in cases involving sentencing.' Aliens often are
deported when the United States government learns of prior con-
victions; an alien who "at any time ... has been convicted of a
violation of ... any law or regulation ... relating to a controlled
substance" may be deported.65 Several cases have addressed the
issue of whether such convictions may be foreign. The Second,66
Stevens v. Jackson, 125 N.Y.S.2d 905, 909 (App. Div. 1953); People v. C~sar, 1 Parker's
Crim. Rep. 645, 648 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855).
61. 258 N.Y.S.2d 769, 772 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
62. Id. at 773.
63. In 1965, New York law authorized the consideration of any conviction "under
the laws of any other state, government, or country" for the purpose of sentence en-
hancement. N.Y. PENAL LA\V § 1941 (McKinney 1917) (amended 1973). Kearney involved
a different statute that prohibited the use of invalid prior judgments "in this state or any
other state" to enhance sentences. N.Y. PENAL LAWv § 1943 (McKinney 1963) (current
version at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.06 (McKinney 1987)). The court noted that especially
compared with § 1941, § 1943 seemed to be restricted to the United States. The court
decided, however, that the legislature had not meant what it wrote. Before § 1943 was
enacted, defendants sentenced under § 1941 could challenge prior New York convictions,
but the legislative history for § 1943 evinced an effort to provide similar procedures for
prior convictions from "another jurisdiction." 1964 N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 514. Because "invid-
ious discrimination" would result from withholding such protection only from those con-
victed in foreign countries, the court read beyond the plain language of § 1943 to make
it cover foreign countries. Kearney, 258 N.Y.S.2d at 774.
64. E.g., Brice v. Pickett, 515 F.2d 153, 154 (9th Cir. 1975).
65. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 1992) (emphasis added).
66. Gardos v. INS, 324 F.2d 179, 180 (2d Cir. 1963) (affirming deportation based on
marijuana conviction from Canada).
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Fifth,67 and Ninth 6' Circuits have held that "any law or regula-
tion" includes foreign laws or regulations. The danger of analyzing
repeat offender cases by comparing them to immigration cases is
that courts protect the rights of aliens less than those of citi-
zens;69 when the language to be interpreted is the same, however,
these decisions have some persuasive authority to guide courts in
deciphering phrases like "any jurisdiction" in repeat offender laws.
B. Judicial Treatment
Once statutory language is interpreted as including foreign
convictions, the issue of whether legislatures indeed have the pow-
er to enhance sentences by counting foreign convictions arises.
Most courts faced with this question have given foreign convictions
at least preliminary consideration, thereby acknowledging legisla-
tures' power to give effect to foreign judgments.7" Other than
possible due process concerns stemming from the use of particular
foreign convictions,71 the issue has been held not to present a
federal question.72 New York courts consistently have upheld the
authority of the state legislature to increase punishment based on
foreign offenses,73 despite the lack of primary jurisdiction over
such crimes.74 Applying New York law, a federal court also ac-
knowledged the legality of counting foreign convictions, finding no
reason to distinguish between foreign countries and sister states.75
67. Pasquini v. INS, 557 F.2d 536, 538-39 (5th Cir. 1977) (deporting Italian alien be-
cause of Bahamian marijuana conviction).
68. Brice, 515 F.2d at 154 (basing deportation on marijuana conviction from Japan
and finding that statutory wording "strongly indicates" that Congress intended to include
foreign convictions).
69. See Pasquini, 557 F.2d at 539 (noting that deportation laws authorizing the use of
foreign convictions do not contemplate subjecting such convictions to American constitu-
tional standards); Brice, 515 F.2d at 154 (holding that aliens may be deported for any
reason "in the best interest of the government"); Pye, supra note 18, at 132-33; see also
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265-67 (1990) (holding that aliens not
residing in United States are not protected as much as citizens but not specifying how
much connection to the United States is necessary to trigger protection).
70. See infra text accompanying notes 73-82.
71. See infra Part III.
72. United States ex rel Read v. Martin, 263 F.2d 606, 606-07 (2d Cir. 1959).
73. See, e.g., People v. LeGrand, 439 N.Y.S.2d 695, 697 (App. Div. 1981) (implicitly
interpreting the statutory language "any other jurisdiction" to include foreign countries);
see also N.Y. PENAL LAw § 70.04(1)(b)(i) (McKinney 1987).
74. People v. Dacey, 3 N.Y.S.2d 156, 165 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1938); People v. Cesar, 1
Parker's Crim. Rep. 645, 648 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855). The Dacey court noted that the ques-
tion depended only on the policy of the state. Dacey, 3 N.Y.S.2d at 166.
75. United States ex rel. Foreman v. Fay, 184 F. Supp. 535, 537, 539 n.15 (S.D.N.Y.
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Courts in other states have reached similar results.76 In
Gwynne v. State,77 for example, an Alabama court rejected the
defendant's contention that his prior Canadian kidnapping offense
could not be a predicate for sentence enhancement under the
habitual offender statute. 8 Because it already was settled law that
"all felonies come within the purview of the habitual felony of-
fender statute, regardless of their origin, 79 the question for the
court was whether foreign felonies fell within the ambit of "all."
The court held that they did, implicitly acknowledging the power
of the legislature to consider foreign convictions." Similarly, a
Washington court held that the principle of comity8 dictates that
"we give full effect to foreign judgments, except in extraordinary
cases."
82
Not all state courts, however, agree on the propriety of using
foreign convictions. Michigan courts in particular have been recal-
citrant. Different cases have espoused different policies, making
the future treatment of foreign convictions in Michigan unclear. 3
The Michigan legislature also has given mixed signals about how
to treat foreign convictions, thereby exacerbating the confusion.'
In People v. Braithwaite, the defendant had escaped from a
Michigan prison.85 During sentencing for the escape, he was
1960).
76. See, e.g., State v. Ralph, 336 So. 2d 836, 840 (La. 1976) (acknowledging that for-
eign convictions could be used), overruled on other grounds by State v. Berndt, 416 So.
2d 56 (La. 1982); Hill v. State, 483 N.W.2d 57, 61 (Minn. 1992) (finding no valid basis
for distinguishing between out-of-country and out-of-state convictions).
77. 499 So. 2d 802 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986).
78. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-9 (1982). The statute reads in part: "In all cases
when . . . a criminal defendant has been previously convicted of any felony and after
such conviction has committed another felony, he must be punished [more severely.]" Id.
§ 13A-5-9(a) (emphasis added).
79. Watson v. State, 392 So. 2d 1274, 1279 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980), writ denied, 392
So. 2d 1280 (Ala. 1981).
80. Gwynne, 499 So. 2d at 809.
81. The principle of comity has been defined as "the recognition which one nation
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation,
having due regard both to international duty and convenience . Hilton v. Guyot,
159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
82. State v. Meyer, 613 P.2d 132, 137 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
83. Compare People v. Braithwaite, 240 N.W.2d 293 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976) (rejecting
foreign convictions) with People v. Wallach, 312 N.W.2d 387 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (indi-
rectly rejecting Braithwaite), vacated on other grounds, 331 N.W.2d 730 (Mich. 1983); see
also infra text accompanying notes 85-97.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 49-52; infra text accompanying notes 89-91.
85. 240 N.W.2d at 294.
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found to have a previous conviction in Canada. The sentencing
judge was greatly influenced by the Canadian conviction in his
decision to give the defendant a prison term rather than merely
put him on probation.86 The appellate court, however, vacated
the sentence because of the sentencing judge's reliance on the
foreign conviction. In a burst of patriotism, the court boasted that
"the constitutional guarantees which our system of justice protects
are different in both kind and degree than those recognized even
in modem democratic systems such as Canada's."87 The court did
not even admit to the possibility that another country's system
might pass muster, holding that "foreign convictions ... should
never be considered by sentencing judges .... "88
The holding in Braithwaite is most surprising when viewed in
the context of Michigan's repeat offender statute at the time. The
statute provided that a defendant with a prior felony conviction
"under the laws of any other state, government, or country"
should be sentenced as a repeat offender.89 The defendant was
not sentenced under this statute, so the court was not bound by it.
However, this law, which had been in force for nearly fifty
years,' manifested a decision by the legislature that foreign con-
victions should be recognized by Michigan courts. It is odd that
the Braithwaite court did not mention this statute when pronounc-
ing its own diametrically opposed view of foreign convictions.
Although Braithwaite was not a repeat offender case, the court's
attitude showed that if it were presented with an ambiguous repeat
offender statute, it would interpret it as excluding foreign convic-
tions. Perhaps swayed by Braithwaite, the Michigan legislature
subsequently amended the repeat offender law so that felonies
"outside this state" could be used as predicate offenses.91 No re-
ported Michigan cases have interpreted whether this ambiguous
language includes foreign convictions.
86. See id. The court did not mention the crime underlying the Canadian conviction-
because the defendant was not sentenced under the recidivist statute, MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 769.10 (West 1974) (amended 1978), it may not have been a felony.
87. Braithwaite, 240 N.W.2d at 294.
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 769.10 (West 1974) (amended 1978).
90. See Act of May 14, 1927, ch. IX, § 11, 1927 Mich. Pub. Acts 324.
91. Act of Mar. 22, 1978, ch. 9, sec. 10 § 769.10, 1978 Mich. Pub. Acts 206 (codified




Later Michigan decisions have criticized Braithwaite without
overruling it, leaving its present authority unclear. In People v.
Wallach,92 a defendant convicted of murder challenged the pros-
ecution's use of his prior Canadian conviction to impeach his testi-
mony. The court noted that although Braithwaite did not apply
directly because it addressed the sentencing phase, its holding
should be considered because a court must be more restrained in
using foreign convictions to prove guilt than to decide a sen-
tence.93 The court took notice of the Braithwaite court's judgment
that convictions from criminal systems different from that in Michi-
gan should be excluded.94 The Wallach court then reasoned that
such a principle would exclude not only foreign convictions, but
sister-state convictions as well.95 Considering this result unsatisfac-
tory, the court concluded that "the blanket prohibition of Braith-
waite should not be followed."" Instead, the court favored a
case-by-case analysis of the procedural safeguards in the relevant
foreign country.'
Even courts that do acknowledge the theoretical validity of
using foreign convictions to enhance sentences often strain to find
reasons not to count them. 98 A common escape route is to distin-
guish the conduct underlying the foreign conviction from conduct
that would be a felony in the relevant state.99
92. 312 N.W.2d 387 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 331 N.W.2d
730 (Mich. 1983).
93. Id. at 403.
94. Id. at 403 n.8.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 403.
97. Id. In Wallach, the court held that the Canadian convictions were improperly
used for impeachment because the prosecution did not attempt to prove that the Canadi-
an legal system was fundamentally fair. Id. at 404. People v. Gaines, 341 N.W.2d 519,
521 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983), moved somewhat further away from Braithwaite by holding
that when using foreign convictions for impeachment, the prosecution need not prove the
existence of procedural safeguards in the foreign country if the defendant does not ob-
ject. The defendant in Gaines had not objected at trial to the court's consideration of his
West German narcotics conviction, so the appellate court affirmed his conviction. Id. at
523-24.
Braithwaite may still be good law, because unlike Wallach and Gaines, it involved
sentencing. Furthermore, the dissent in Gaines defended Braithwaite, noting the logistical
difficulty of researching the legal systems of countries using foreign languages. Id. at 524
(Maher, J., dissenting).
98. Pye, supra note 18, at 130-31.
99. The requirement that the underlying conduct constitute a felony applies to sister-
state convictions as well. But see exceptions cited infra note 196. Almost any comparison
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In State v. O'Day,1"0 the Louisiana Supreme Court's distinc-
tion in this regard was particularly tortured. Jack O'Day was con-
victed of manslaughter and sentenced as a three-time felony of-
fender. One of his previous convictions was in Canada, where he
had served a two-year prison sentence for stealing a car; the other
conviction was in Oregon.11 The state had the burden of proving
that these prior offenses amounted to felonies in Louisiana."
Without any discussion, the Louisiana court held that the Oregon
conviction was sufficient to justify conviction as a two-time offend-
er. 103
The court closely scrutinized the Canadian conviction, how-
ever, and held that it could not be a predicate for enhancing
O'Day's sentence. Under Canadian law at the time of the offense,
it was possible to be convicted of "stealing an automobile" without
proof of asportation,'" an element that the O'Day court held to
be essential to the definition of larceny in Louisiana. 05 Because
O'Day "may have done no more than open the car door, get into
it, [and] attempt to manipulate the switch and the starter," the
of statutes from different states reveals subtle differences in the conduct proscribed;
courts intent on discounting out-of-state convictions usually can do so. Some courts have
limited their inquiry to the statutory elements of the other state's crime, while others
have further considered the conduct underlying the conviction from the other state in de-
termining whether such a conviction could be used to enhance a sentence. Compare
People v. Hickey, 167 Cal. Rptr. 256, 263 (Ct. App. 1980) (rejecting the use of any ex-
trinsic evidence and limiting consideration to the elements of both states' statutes) with
People v. Cheri, 179 Cal. Rptr. 423, 425 (Ct. App. 1981) (allowing the examination of
any evidence of record to establish whether the conduct underlying the out-of-state con-
viction would have been a felony in California) (disapproved in People v. Crowson, 660
P.2d 389, 395 n.10 (Cal. 1983)).
100. 185 So. 290 (La. 1938).
101. Id. at 292. The existence of the Canadian conviction was proved by certificates
from the Canadian penitentiary and the vice consul of the United States in Canada, but
the court did not mention how the Louisiana government obtained this information. Id.
at 298. The lack of an efficient system for gaining access to such information may be a
reason for the paucity of sentence enhancement cases concerning prior foreign convic-
tions. The convenience of obtaining evidence from foreign countries has increased dramat-
ically, however, through the signing of various mutual legal assistance treaties. Prosecutors
therefore should not have as much difficulty investigating the conduct underlying foreign
convictions in the future. Nadelmann, supra note 14, at 37-38, 57-58.
102. O'Day, 185 So. at 294.
103. Id. at 299.
104. "The removal of things from one place to another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
114 (6th ed. 1990).
105. O'Day, 185 So. at 293 (citing Criminal Code, R.S.C. ch. 36, § 347 (1927) (Can.)).
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court ignored the Canadian crime in sentencing him for the Louisi-
ana manslaughter."°
Although it is within the Louisiana legislature's power to
require that a predicate felony constitute a felony in Louisiana,"7
the policy goal behind weeding out foreign convictions so vigor-
ously is questionable.0 8 In O'Day, the state made no showing as
to the facts underlying the Canadian conviction. The prosecution
of O'Day in Canada and the two-year jail sentence there, however,
suggest that he probably did steal the car, asportation and all; it is
unlikely that O'Day would have been prosecuted so vigorously if
all he had done was get in the car."9 According to the U.S. Su-
preme Court, sentences are supposed to be based on "the fullest
information possible concerning the defendant's life and character-
istics,"'' 0 and this information need not be proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt."' Surely, a conviction for stealing a car was rele-
vant information about O'Day's "life and characteristics." Even if
his conduct conceivably would not have constituted a felony in
Louisiana, it was not the sort of foreign crime that American
courts should ignore on constitutional grounds, such as speech
critical of a government.
If the state had proved that the underlying conduct of the
Canadian conviction would have been a felony in Louisiana, the
O'Day court would have counted the Canadian conviction. Even
though all the elements of the Louisiana crime were not covered
by the Canadian statute," the legislative prohibition against en-
hancing sentences based on out-of-state conduct not proscribed in
Louisiana would not have been relevant. In contrast, the New
York court in People ex rel. Stevens v. Jackson"' foreclosed any
possibility of using a Canadian conviction when the Canadian
statute differed from the analogous New York statute, regardless
106. Id. at 294 (emphasis added).
107. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1(A) (West 1992).
108. For further discussion of the policy reasons to use foreign convictions, see infra
Part II.
109. Prosecutors have wide discretion in Canada. Brian A. Grosman, The Role of the
Prosecutor in Canada, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 498, 502-03 (1970).
110. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
111. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 (1986).
112. State v. O'Day, 185 So. 290, 294 (La. 1938). The court did not indicate what
level of proof by the state would have been necessary.
113. 125 N.Y.S.2d 905 (App. Div. 1953).
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of any proof as to the conduct actually underlying the foreign
conviction.
The defendant in Stevens was convicted and sentenced as a
four-time offender based in part on a prior Canadian conviction
for breaking into a home and stealing a ring and other items.114
Satisfied that this offense was equivalent to burglary in New York,
the trial court counted the foreign conviction.' The appellate
court, however, closely compared the two relevant statutes and
held that because intent was part of the New York statute but was
not mentioned in the Canadian statute,"6 the conviction could
not be used.' The court recognized that the defendant not only
stole but also probably intended to do so."" Nevertheless, the
court focused only on the statutory language. Because intent was
not an element of the crime for which the defendant was convict-
ed in Canada, the offense could not be counted."9
Courts considering foreign convictions outside the realm of
recidivist statutes have not analyzed the elements of underlying
offenses as closely. In McElvy v. Civiletti,12 ° for example, a feder-
al court considered foreign convictions in the context of an extra-
dition treaty between the United States and the United King-
dom.' One of the requirements for extradition from the United
States under the treaty is that the offense committed by the fugi-
114. Id. at 908-09.
115. Id. at 908.
116. The New York statute provided: "A person who . . . [w]ith intent to commit a
crime therein, breaks and enters a building . . . [i]s guilty of burglary . . . ." N.Y. PE-
NAL LAW § 404 (McKinney 1944) (current version at §§ 140.20, .25 (McKinney 1987)).
The Canadian counterpart provided: "Every one is guilty of an indictable offence ...
who . . . breaks and enters any dwelling-house by day and commits any indictable of-
fence therein .... " TREMEEAR'S ANNOTATED CRIMINAL CODE § 458 (5th ed. 1944)
(current version at Criminal Code, R.S.C. ch. 46, § 348 (1985) (Can.)).
117. Stevens, 125 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
118. Id. at 908.
119. Id. at 909; see also People v. LeGrand, 439 N.Y.S.2d 695, 696-97 (App. Div.
1981) (holding that previous Canadian convictions for assault and fraud could not be
used to sentence defendant as a repeat offender because of the statutory definitions of
those crimes in Canada). But see People ex rel. LaTraverse v. Jackson, 132 N.Y.S.2d 115,
116 (App. Div. 1954) (presuming that the intent requisite to make a Canadian conviction
for breaking and entering equivalent to the New York felony of breaking and entering
was present, even though the certificate of conviction obtained from the Canadian gov-
ernment did not mention intent, because the relevant Canadian statute required intent).
120. 523 F. Supp. 42, 43 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
121. Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972-Oct. 21, 1976, U.S.-U.K., 28 U.S.T. 227.
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tive constitute a felony under United States law." The petition-
ers in McElvy were convicted of marijuana possession in the Turks
and Caicos Islands."2 The law under which they were convicted
did not establish a minimum amount of marijuana necessary to
constitute possession, so in theory the petitioners might have been
convicted despite possessing only a minute quantity. They argued
that the only analogous United States law was 21 U.S.C. § 844(a),
which proscribes the possession of even small amounts of marijua-
na but classifies the crime as only a misdemeanor.124 Under the
strict analysis of Stevens, the petitioners would have been correct
in arguing that their foreign convictions could not constitute felo-
nies under United States law. The McElvy court, however, consid-
ered evidence surrounding the Turks and Caicos convictions that
suggested that the petitioners had been in possession of vast
amounts of marijuana and concluded that the petitioners had en-
gaged in activities that would be classified as felonies in the Unit-
ed States."
The court acknowledged the "theoretical possibility" that the
prior conviction was not equivalent to a felony in the United
States 26 but noted that the evidence also allowed the inference
that the petitioners intended to distribute the marijuana, which
raised the level of crime to a felony.27 If the Stevens court had
used a similar flexible analysis, it would have recognized the
defendant's burglary conviction from Canada. Notwithstanding the
different contexts of McElvy and Stevens, the issue in each was
essentially the same: whether the conduct underlying a foreign
conviction constituted a felony in the United States.2  Without
122. Id. at 229-30.
123. The Islands are a British possession.
124. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (Supp. V 1993); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a) (1988) (classify-
ing crimes punishable by a prison term of one year or less as misdemeanors).
125. McElvy v. Civiletti, 523 F. Supp. 42, 49 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 49 n.2; see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1988).
128. In McElvy, the language interpreted was that of the treaty: "Extradition shall be
granted ... [if] the offense constitutes a felony under the law of the United States of
America." McElvy, 523 F. Supp. at 47 (quoting Extradition Treaty, supra note 121, at
229-30). In Stevens, the language at issue was from the New York repeat offender stat-
ute: "A person, who, after having been convicted .. .under the laws of any other state,
government, or country, of a crime which, if committed within this state, would be a
felony, . . . is punishable [as a repeat offender]." N.Y. PENAL LAW § .1941 (McKinney
1917) (current version at § 70.10 (McKinney 1987)).
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clear standards for evaluating the validity of such convictions, the
results of future cases will continue to vary among courts.
II. POLICY REASONS TO CONSIDER FOREIGN CONVICTIONS
The legislatures that have not yet done so should explicitly
include foreign convictions in their recidivist statutes as potential
predicates for sentence enhancement. Similarly, courts faced with
statutes that are unclear in their scope should interpret them
broadly to include foreign convictions.'29 This policy would both
further the underlying goals of criminal punishment and protect
against unequal treatment of offenders.13
One approach to the issue of how foreign convictions should
be treated is to examine the theoretical bases of criminal punish-
ment and assess whether the consideration of foreign convictions
advances appropriate goals.131 A survey of the perceived pur-
poses of punishment and the specific goals of repeat offender
The attitude of the McElvy court toward recognizing foreign convictions was funda-
mentally different from that of the Stevens court: "This court certainly does not hold that
a foreign conviction must contain all the elements of an analogous offense in this coun-
try .... ." McElvy, 523 F. Supp. at 49 n.2 (emphasis added).
129. This inclusion should still be subject to an analysis of the fairness of the foreign
conviction. See infra Part III.
130. If possible, American states should address this issue with one voice, so that
other countries know what effect their judgments will have here. See Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (acknowledging that "single-voiced statement[s] of the Government's
views" are often desirable but not relinquishing the power of courts to address questions
concerning foreign relations); Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 50
(2d Cir. 1965) ("It is fundamental to our constitutional scheme that in dealing with other
nations the country must speak with a united voice."), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966).
The D.C. Circuit has noted that matters "interwoven with . . . policies in regard to the
conduct of foreign relations [are] entrusted to the political branches of government as to
be largely immune from judicial inquiry." Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1215 (D.C.
Cir.) (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952)), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 869 (1972). The judicial and executive branches of the federal government some-
times clash over the intersection of criminal justice and foreign policy. Nadelmann, supra
note 14, at 43. State legislatures should make clear decisions about respecting foreign
judgments so that courts confronted with ambiguous statutes are not pressured by the
executive branch, which may have concerns about the foreign policy implications of
counting foreign convictions. The fight against crime is universal, and matters of jurisdic-
tion should not stop countries from helping each other execute penal laws to the fullest,
1 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & VED P. NANDA, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW § 1.9, at
475 (1973); interest in the administration of criminal justice is common to "all peoples of
the modern world." 1 id. at 476 (quoting Manley 0. Hudson, The Proposed International
Criminal Court, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 549, 553 (1938)).
131. It is widely thought that the moral philosophy underlying punishment should
guide policy. See DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY 9 (1990).
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statutes reveals that the inclusion of foreign convictions advances
these goals whereas exclusion hinders them.
Historically, the principal theories of punishment have been
rehabilitation, deterrence, and retribution.132 Until the 1970s, the
prevailing attitude in the United States was that punishment
should rehabilitate criminals. This idea appealed both to liberals,
who approved of the attention given to the individual offender,
and to conservatives, who perceived the community as being pro-
tected by keeping incorrigible criminals in prison longer than peo-
ple who could easily mend their ways. 33 Deterrence also was
emphasized as a goal of punishment; the focus on future criminali-
ty and the behavioral analysis involved in determining what pun-
ishments to mete out were seen as progressive.' Retribution, by
contrast, was regarded as an "irrational vestige of benighted
times"'35 because its moral arrogance136 made it appear unpro-
gressive 137 and backward-looking. 1
38
The recent trend, however, has been to downplay rehabilita-
tion and deterrence while emphasizing the goal of retribution. 39
According to many observers, rehabilitation has been "thoroughly
132. Norman A. Carlson, The Future of Prisons, TRIAL, Mar. 1976, at 27.
133. Andrew von Hirsch, Recent Trends in American Criminal Sentencing Theory, 42
MD. L. REV. 6, 7-9 (1983); see also Robert Fishman, An Evaltation of Criminal Recidi-
vism in Projects Providing Rehabilitation and Diversion Services in New York City, 68 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 283, 299 (1977) (showing the failure of rehabilitation through
empirical data).
134. IGOR PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 9-11 (1989).
135. David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623, 1623
(1992); see also Carlson, supra note 132, at 29 (noting the "humaneness" of rehabilita-
tion).
136. Philosophers associated with advocating retributivism to express moral outrage
include Immanuel Kant and Emile Durkheim. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF
PRACTICAL REASON 39 (Lewis W. Beck trans., 1956); EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION
OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 108 (George Simpson trans., 1965). But cf. CESARE BECCARIA,
ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 13 (Henry Paolucci trans., 1963) ("Punishments that ex-
ceed what is necessary for protection of the [public] are by their very nature un-
just ....").
137. Von Hirsch, supra note 133, at 8.
138. Ernest W. Schoellkopff, Comment, Ordering the Purposes of Sentencing: A Pro-
logue to Guidelines, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 503, 518 (1986).
139. RALPH D. ELLIS & CAROL S. ELLIS, THEORIES OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 55 (1989).
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discredited as a basic justification for criminal punishment, 1 40
and retribution is the new ideal.141
Many state courts have articulated the policies underlying
repeat offender statutes. 42 Retribution is the philosophy cited
most often, although deterrence'43  and rehabilitation 44  also
have been mentioned as rationales. The Rhode Island Supreme
Court, for example, commenting on the state's habitual offender
statute,' 45 observed that "[tihe statute reflects the Legislature's
determination that a third or subsequent offense is more serious
than a first or second offense and accordingly should be punish-
able as such. 1 46 Similarly, Washington's recidivist statute1 47 has
been characterized as "purely penal.',
14 8
140. Schoellkopff, supra note 138, at 503. Empirical studies showing the ineffectiveness
of rehabilitation brought about its downfall as a penological ideal. See, e.g., STEPHEN R.
BRODY, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SENTENCING 5 (1976). Concern about inequalities result-
ing from disparities in sentencing among like offenders also contributed to the decline of
rehabilitation. Von Hirsch, supra note 133, at 12-13. Defenders of the theory now have
been reduced to arguing that one can still "hope" that prison will reform offenders.
MOORE ET AL., supra note 22, at 23.
141. See, e.g., Dolinko, supra note 135, at 1623. The current popularity of determinate
sentencing has been based on retributivism. Schoellkopff, supra note 138, at 517-18. The
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 officially recognizes retribution, deterrence, incapacitation,
and rehabilitation as sentencing goals, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1988), but retribution has
been called the principal philosophy behind the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
Schoellkopff, supra note 138, at 504, 518.
A change in the language of an authoritative hornbook is a telling indicator of
retributivism's ascent. The second edition of LaFave & Scott's Criminal Law, WAYNE R.
LAFAE &. AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 25 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter
LAFAE & SCOTT (2d ed.)], omitted the following emphasized language that was includ-
ed in the first edition: "[Retribution] is the oldest theory of punishment, and the one
which is least accepted today by theorists .... " WAYNE R. LAFAE & AUSTIN W.
SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 24 (1972) (emphasis added); see Dolinko,
supra note 135, at 1623 n.2 (noting this alteration).
142. The U.S. Supreme Court also has commented on the policies behind recidivist
statutes, characterizing their purposes as deterrence and incapacitation. Rummel v. Estelle,
445 U.S. 263, 284 (1980).
143. See, e.g., State v. Conley, 222 N.W.2d 501, 503 (Iowa 1974) ("Recidivist statutes
are enacted in an effort to deter and punish incorrigible offenders.").
144. See, e.g., Rezin v. State, 596 P.2d 226, 227 (Nev. 1979) ("By enacting the habitu-
al criminal statute, the legislature sought . . . to afford [repeat offenders] an opportunity
to reform.").
145. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-21 (1981) (amended 1988).
146. State v. Tregaskis, 540 A.2d 1022, 1026 (R.I. 1988).
147. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.92.090 (West 1971) (amended 1992).
148. State v. Wait, 509 P.2d 372, 375 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
930 (1974); see also People v. Sunday, 455 N.W.2d 321, 322 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (not-
ing that the purpose of Michigan's recidivist statute, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 769.10-.12 (West Supp. 1994), is to punish "indifference to the law").
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Even under the outmoded doctrine of rehabilitation, the use
of foreign convictions as predicates for repeat offender statutes
would be warranted. One who violates laws in another country 49
is just as dangerous in the future as one who violates laws in the
United States and is therefore equally in need of rehabilitation. A
rehabilitationist might argue that a foreign crime, even if its under-
lying conduct was such that it could be proscribed by an American
legislature without constitutional problems, is the product of a
foreign society and that therefore a foreign crime is not an indi-
cator of a defendant's need for rehabilitation. Even if one pre-
sumed a defendant's foreign conviction to be the product of a
foreign society, though, such a presumption should be negated by
the first commission of a felony in the United States. 5 '
A deterrence rationale, in contrast, somewhat minimizes the
need to consider foreign convictions. Criminals in the United
States with foreign criminal records might be deterred by recidivist
statutes that count foreign convictions; neither the entry into the
United States of people with foreign criminal records nor the rate
of crime abroad by people who plan to come to the United States,
however, likely would be affected. Still, potential foreign criminals
should be able to know whether United States courts will take
notice of their foreign convictions so that they can rely on the
law.151
149. Foreign convictions under laws that would be unconstitutional in the United
States are exceptions. See infra text accompanying note 202.
150. Most foreigners who enter the United States do not commit felonies here. See
SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND
THE NATIONAL INTEREST: STAFF REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRA-
TION AND REFUGEE POLICY TO THE CONGRESS AND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES 181 (1981). If a defendant with a criminal record in another country does com-
mit a felony here, it is more likely than not that the defendant's criminality is less su-
perficial or ephemeral, and that therefore the amount of behavioral conditioning (i.e.,
imprisonment) necessary to rehabilitate the defendant is greater, than in the case of a
recidivist with a record confined to the United States. Under a rehabilitative system,
therefore, the foreign crimes should be considered at sentencing. Although foreign crimes
may be merely a product of a foreign society, the reasonable doubt standard does not
apply at the sentencing phase, McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 (1986); by the
preponderance of evidence, foreign crimes do shed light on a defendant's character. See
infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
151. According to the principle of legality, people may not be punished for conduct
unless they had the opportunity to know that the conduct was proscribed. LAFAVE &
SCOTT (2d ed.), supra note 141, at 195.
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Retribution, however, has become the prevailing theory of
punishment, not only in a broad sense"' but also in the specific
context of repeat offender statutes,153 and its principles provide
the most compelling reasons to include foreign convictions. Retri-
bution theory focuses not on what is best for society or for the
offender; instead, it bases the severity of punishment on the gravi-
ty of the act committed. 54 Courts that have explicitly cited re-
peat offender statutes as retributive in nature consider a subse-
quent crime worse in and of itself than a first crime.155 Retribu-
tion theory does not contemplate punishing the first crime twice.
Rather, a second offense, although possibly identical to the first in
its outward conduct, deserves more punishment because its com-
mission implies that the offender has not reformed despite being
punished for the first one."' Andrew von Hirsch, a "leading pro-
ponent[] of retribution,'' 57 has explained, "A repetition of the
offense following [an earlier] conviction may be regarded as more
culpable, since [the criminal] persisted in the behavior after having
been forcefully censured for it . ... ,"8
A criminal should not be able to erase prior crimes by coming
to the United States. In fact, the commission of a second crime in
a second country warrants, if anything, more retribution than a
second crime in the same country, because a person entering a
new country has a chance to break free from old patterns and
start anew.1 59 Thus, the commission of a crime in a second coun-
152. See supra text accompanying notes 139-41.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 142-48.
154. ELLIS & ELLIS, supra note 139, at 2.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 142-48.
156. The popular description of strict repeat offender statutes such as that in Wash-
ington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.120(4) (West Supp. 1994), captures this
idea-"Three Strikes and You're Out." Gross, supra note 3, at Al. In baseball, batters
have less leeway with one or two strikes than with none. Swinging at a bad pitch with
no strikes is like a misdemeanor but with two strikes is like a felony; the eventual strike-
out, however, does not retroactively make the original strike any worse per se.
157. Schoellkopff, supra note 138, at 512.
158. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 85 (1976).
159. The United States, in particular, conveys this image. See Mark J. Estren, Take
Pride in a Spanish Accent, and Learn to Communicate Well, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 20,
1986, at 66B; Colin Nickerson, Some New Americans Enjoy Roast Turkey, Pie and Cha
Gio Eggrolls, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 27, 1985, at Al. Some may advocate crediting a
person with a clean slate upon entry into the United States, but the subsequent commis-
sion of a crime shows in retrospect that no such erasure of history was appropriate. See
supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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try likely manifests individual fault rather than that of a particular
environment."0
Furthermore, the failure fo include foreign convictions as
predicates for sentence enhancement ignores not only the policies
behind such statutes, but also notions of equality. 6' The princi-
ple that like defendants should be treated alike is basic;62 the
site of a previous crime is not a rational basis for distinguishing
between two defendants whose conduct has been identical.163
Ironically, "[t]he traditional skeptical attitude of Americans to-
wards any criminal procedure other than that of the Anglo-Saxon
system"'16 disadvantages Americans sentenced as repeat offend-
ers, compared to defendants who have committed previous crimes
outside the country. The Washington Supreme Court, however,
evinced a more cosmopolitan view in holding that a defendant's
prior rape conviction in West Germany could be considered as a
factor to justify sentencing the defendant to the maximum allow-
able term."6 Cutting through a haze of arguments about whether
a judgment of the West German legal system should be respected,
the trial court judge commented on the previous conviction, "That
was a rape.''166 This judge recognized that the prior conduct of
defendants in other countries is relevant to the discretionary deci-
160. Retribution theory measures punishment according to the immorality of an of-
fense in light of its surrounding circumstances. For example, under this theory, a person
who steals money to buy food for a starving child does not deserve as much punishment
as one who steals money to buy a stereo. When the criminal history of a repeat offender
has been limited to one country, the crimes can be attributed to external forces more
easily than when the history is international; it is likely, if not beyond a reasonable
doubt, that a criminal with an international criminal record deserves more retributive
punishment. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
161. Problems of unfairness in sentencing have long plagued American courts. See,
e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 7 3, 734
(1980); William W. Wilkins, Jr. et al., The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Bold Ap-
proach to the Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity Problem, 2 CRIM. L.F. 355, 356 (1991).
162. Schoellkopff, supra note 138, at 504; see also 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988)
(providing that defendants with similar records who have committed similar crimes should
be similarly sentenced to avoid unwarranted disparities). The uneven sentencing of simi-
larly situated defendants was one of the problems that spawned the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 365 (1989); see also S. REP. No. 225,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 44-46 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3224, 3227-29 (citing a
study in which judges given identical hypothetical case files handed down widely disparate
sentences).
163. People v. Kearney, 258 N.Y.S.2d 769, 774-75 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
164. Pye, supra note 18, at 115.
165. State v. Herzog, 771 P.2d 739, 745 (Wash. 1989).
166. Id. at 740.
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sions judges make when sentencing.167 The reprieve that judicial
ignorance of this relevance grants to foreign criminals can lead to
"invidious discrimination ' 168 against domestic criminals, which in
turn harms the American public by precluding the attainment of
the level of protection from repeat offenders that legislatures have
deemed necessary.
III. LIMITS ON THE USE OF FOREIGN CONVICTIONS
The proposition that foreign convictions should be used to
enhance penalties under repeat offender statutes does not suggest
that they should escape scrutiny for fairness. Respect for foreign
judgments should be extended only when warranted. Sister-state
convictions may not be used if they are held to have been uncon-
stitutionally obtained, 6 9 and exempting foreign convictions from
any type of due process analysis would discriminate against defen-
dants with foreign convictions. 70 The difficult issues are deciding
to what extent the U.S. Constitution or the relevant state constitu-
tion applies and choosing a standard for providing protection
where a constitution does not. The court in People v. Wallach...
summarized the principal concerns:
The problem of the use of evidence of foreign convictions in-
volves a balancing of competing policy interests. On the one
hand, we do not want to make use of evidence of convictions
obtained in a system which is not fundamentally fair. On the
other hand, we do not want miscreants to look upon Michigan as
a sanctuary where their criminal activity in foreign countries can
have no bearing on issues raised by new illegalities."
Although it is debatable whether, as some commentators have
claimed, "[t]he American people currently profess great faith in
the criminal justice system,"'' it is likely that "[t]o Americans,
steeped in a long and unique tradition of criminal-trial fairness,
167. Id. at 740-41. "[lit would simply be unfair" to disfavor criminals whose prior
criminality was confined to one geographical area. Hill v. State, 483 N.W.2d 57, 61
(Minn. 1992).
168. People v. Kearney, 258 N.Y.S.2d 769, 774 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
169. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 448 (1972).
170. See Kearney, 258 N.Y.S.2d at 773.
171. 312 N.W.2d 387 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (considering foreign conviction used to
impeach a witness), vacated on other grounds, 331 N.W.2d 730 (Mich. 1983).
172. Id. at 403.
173. Lee & Searle-White, supra note 15, at 32.
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the prospect of a foreign prosecution under less protective stan-
dards is disturbing."'74 However, "the erroneous belief that ours
alone is a system which guarantees fairness to a criminal defen-
dant"'75 has led some courts to hold that foreign convictions nev-
er should be considered in sentencing.'76 This view may be myo-
pic, but certainly not all foreign judgments should be embraced.
Reports have detailed incidences of physically tortured confessions
in Mexican jails,'" for example, and United States courts have
expressed outrage at injustices in the legal systems of several other
countries.17
Courts have varied considerably in their approaches to evalu-
ating the legal systems of foreign countries when deciding whether
to respect foreign judgments; positions range from an absolute ban
on foreign convictions... to a lack of standards altogether. 8'
174. Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1223 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869
(1972).
175. Gerhard O.W. Mueller, International Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters, 7
VILL. L. REv. 193, 220 (1961-1962).
176. See, e.g., People v. Braithwaite, 240 N.W.2d 293, 294 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976)
(holding that considering foreign convictions would be "manifestly unfair"); see also supra
text accompanying notes 85-88.
177. U.S. Citizens Imprisoned in Mexico: Hearings on H.R. Res. 313 Before the
Subcomm. on International, Political, and Military Affairs of the House Comm on Interna-
tional Relations (Part II), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1976) (statement of Hon. Leonard F.
Walentynowiez, administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of
State) (noting a pattern of deprivation of basic rights of American prisoners in Mexico);
see also U.S. Citizens Imprisoned in Mexico: Hearings on H.R. Res. 313 Before the
Subcomm. on International, Political, and Military Affairs of the House Comm. on Interna-
tional Relations (Part I), 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1975) (statement of Rep. Fortney H.
Stark).
178. For example, a federal judge has decried the lack of "basic justice" in Iranian
courts, noting that if the parties defending against a motion for forum non conveniens
"returned to Iran to prosecute [their] claim, they would probably be shot." Rasoulzadeh
v. Associated Press, 574 F. Supp. 854, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 767 F.2d 908 (2d Cir.
1985); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 758 F.2d 341, 346
(8th Cir.) (observing that Americans are not treated fairly in Iranian courts), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 948 (1985). But see Cooley v. Weinberger, 518 F.2d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 1975)
(recognizing the "legitimate legal process" of Iranian courts). A glance at the dates of
these cases reveals that the revolution crippled justice in Iran, at least by American
standards. One of the difficulties inherent in considering foreign convictions is that evalu-
ations of the fairness of foreign legal systems must be updated continually to reflect
political changes; making such judgments might strain courts' resources.
179. Braithwaite, 240 N.W.2d at 293.
180. Brice v. Pickett, 515 F.2d 153, 154 (9th Cir. 1975) (affirming deportation because
of prior conviction of marijuana possession) ("Even if [petitioner] could prove that the
[Japanese] conviction was obtained in proceedings which if conducted in this country
would be violative of United States constitutional guarantees, we find no requirement
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The most popular method has been to apply constitutional proce-
dural due process standards, just as courts do in evaluating sister-
state convictions as predicates for sentence enhancement. 1'
One problem with using traditional due process standards,
though, is that the U.S. Constitution has a limited range of author-
ity. Cases such as United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,'82 which
held that the Fourth Amendment does not protect aliens outside
the United States even when they are unwillingly subjected to the
jurisdiction of United States courts, imply that defendants cannot
claim due process protection in foreign courts. 83 In other words,
the U.S. Constitution cannot be "imposed" on foreign proceed-
ings."8 In Reid v. Covert, however, the Supreme Court noted
that citizens do not lose their rights by going abroad.8 5 Com-
bined with Verdugo-Urquidez, this holding suggests that if both a
citizen and an alien were tried in the United States under a repeat
offender statute and each had prior, foreign convictions in the
same country, only the citizen would benefit from the due process
scrutiny of the legal system of the foreign country. This disparity
would violate the principle of equality.'86
A solution used by many courts is to restrict the reach of the
Constitution and instead evaluate foreign convictions using a myth-
ical universal standard of fairness." The Supreme Court has not-
ed that "[flew would be so narrow or provincial as to maintain
that a fair and enlightened system of justice would be impossible
without [certain elements of American constitutional protec-
that a foreign court's proceedings or conviction must conform to United States constitu-
tional standards.").
181. United States ex rel. Foreman v. Fay, 184 F. Supp. 535, 537, 539 n.15 (S.D.N.Y.
1960); People v. Kearney, 258 N.Y.S.2d 769, 772 (Sup. Ct. 1965); see also Pye, supra note
18, at 129 ("A strict standard would nullify the effect of almost all foreign convictions
obtained in civil law countries.").
182. 494 U.S. 259, 274-75 (1990).
183. See State v. Ford, 499 P.2d 699, 707 (Ariz. 1972) (noting that Americans leaving
the country risk losing American procedural safeguards), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1128
(1973).
184. Houle v. United States, 493 F.2d 915, 916 (5th Cir. 1974); see also People v. La
Fargue, 195 Cal. Rptr. 438, 444 (Ct. App. 1983) (noting that foreign countries are not
bound by U.S. Constitution).
185. 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957).
186. See supra t6xt accompanying notes 161-68.
187. A difficulty with this approach is defining the universal standard. For a discussion
of the variety of ways to express such a standard, see Frances T. Freeman Jalet, The
Quest for the General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations-A Study, 10
UCLA L. REV. 1041 (1963).
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tion]."'88 A federal court subsequently applied a test of funda-
mental fairness to a sentence that had been enhanced by a prior
Mexican conviction, holding that "so long as there was ... funda-
mental [procedural] fairness, the Mexican conviction and sentence
can be relied upon by this court for its sentence enhancement pur-
poses.' 189 The application of a reasonable standard to appraise
the procedural fairness of foreign convictions is an indispensable
companion to the use of such convictions to enhance sentenc-
es.19
0
IV. A PROPOSED STANDARD
Legislatures and courts in the United States should consider
foreign convictions under repeat offender statutes. The decision to
consider foreign convictions is only a starting point, however; the
true effect accorded such convictions varies greatly with the type
of limitations imposed to ensure fairness. The standard of "funda-
mental fairness" used by many courts misinterprets the issue; a
"reliability of conviction" standard is more appropriate. To apply
this standard, courts should inquire whether a foreign conviction is
reliable evidence that indeed a crime did occur and whether the
188. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
189. United States v. Moskovits, 784 F. Supp. 183, 189-90 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (noting
that holding another country's courts to United States procedural standards would be
"cultural imperialism" and holding that Mexican conviction did not pass the fairness test
because counsel was not provided to defendant); see also People v. Wallach, 312 N.W.2d
387, 403 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (using standard of "fundamental fairness" to scrutinize
foreign conviction to be used for impeachment), vacated on other grounds, 331 N.W.2d
730 (Mich. 1983).
190. One could argue that the United States interferes with other nations' sovereignty
by giving effect to foreign convictions in its courts. See 2 BASSIOUNI & NANDA, supra
note 130, § 6.2, at 38-39. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that "[a] sovereign nation
has exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses against its laws committed within its borders."
Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 529 (1957). Although the concept of "sovereignty" is
difficult to define, HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINA-
TION 14 (1990), perhaps because it often is used in political rhetoric, ALAN JAMES, SOV-
EREIGN STATEHOOD 1 (1986), basically it represents "the right of a state to freedom
from foreign intervention in its internal affairs." JANKOVIt, supra note 15, at 114; see
also U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4 (protecting the "territorial integrity" of each nation). The
question arises of whether the use of foreign offenses as predicates for enhanced sentenc-
es constitutes "punishing" the foreign offense. Recidivist statutes punish only the newest
offense, not the predicate crimes. See supra text accompanying notes 145-46, 155-58.
Therefore, recidivist statutes do not violate the sovereignty of other nations. In fact, the
principle of comity among nations dictates respect for foreign judgments. State v. Meyer,
613 P.2d 132, 137 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980); see supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
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underlying conduct could be proscribed by an American state
legislature and withstand a federal constitutional challenge.
The "fundamental fairness" and "reliability of conviction"
standards overlap significantly. For example, a forced confession
casts doubt on the determination of guilt at a trial, and a convic-
tion based on such a confession would fail under both standards.
Whereas the fundamental fairness approach is merely a diluted
version of traditional procedural due process, however, the reliabil-
ity of conviction standard is qualitatively different. Analysis under
fundamental fairness excludes foreign convictions not only on the
basis of injustices that cast doubt on the guilt of the defendant,
but also on the basis of egregious conduct by a foreign govern-
ment that is deemed to have violated a fundamental right of the
defendant without placing the correctness of the verdict in
doubt. 9' The reliability of conviction standard, on the other
hand, focuses only on whether the defendant actually engaged in
the conduct constituting a crime in the foreign country, without
regard to egregious governmental conduct per se.'
The reliability of conviction standard necessitates the applica-
tion of a "hierarchy of rights" to determine which rights are so
important that their violation casts doubt on the reliability of a
conviction. 93 The standard rests on the same principle the Bur-
ger Court often invoked in emphasizing the importance of truth-
finding at trials: the criminal process should concentrate more on
191. For example, a verdict based on evidence that would have been suppressed un-
der the exclusionary rule in the United States, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), would
not be in doubt.
192. An analysis of the law of entrapment illustrates the difference between the two
standards. The subjective test that the Supreme Court has used focuses on the predisposi-
tion of a defendant to engage in the relevant criminal conduct rather than on the actions
of government agents. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 373 (1958); Sorrells v.
United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932). This idea is similar in its approach to the focus
on the defendant of the reliability of conviction standard. The Supreme Court has hinted,
however, at the possibility of a due process defense to government overinvolvement that
would acquit even a predisposed defendant if the actions of the government were particu-
larly censurable. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973). The Third Circuit
upheld this defense in United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 380-81 (3d Cir. 1978). The
results of cases applying this defense are analogous to those using the fundamental fair-
ness approach to foreign convictions, under which a defendant who actually engaged in
the conduct underlying the conviction may receive somewhat of a reprieve from the
violation of a personal constitutional right by the foreign government.
193. See Charles H. Whitebread, The Burger Court's Counter-Revolttion in Criminal
Procedure: The Recent Criminal Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 24
WVASHBURN L.J. 471, 471 (1985).
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separating the guilty from the innocent than on controlling official
abuses of governmental power.19 4
Within the United States, it is conceivable that the controver-
sial balance between the competing policies of convicting criminals
and deterring egregious government conduct is properly struck;
efforts to deter oppressive conduct of foreign governments, howev-
er, have little justification, so courts should focus solely on the
reliability of conviction. The Arizona Supreme Court essentially
reached this conclusion, noting that "[iut is not the purpose of the
rules in Mapp [v. Ohio] and Miranda [v. Arizona] to teach the
Canadian police that their efforts will be Wasted if they do not
follow our basic laws. We have no extraterritorial jurisdiction even
if that were our purpose."'95
In addition to using the reliability of conviction standard,
states should eliminate the requirement that foreign convictions
constitute crimes in the American state in order to be counted. 96
Conduct should be judged "by the prevailing norms in the jurisdic-
tion where it was committed." '197 The principle of legality98 as-
sumes, rightly or wrongly, that people are aware of laws. To some
degree at least, people are influenced by legality and are less
likely to engage in illegal conduct than in legal conduct, other
factors being equal.199 A person who has committed a crime in
another country has perhaps demonstrated not only the propensity
to engage in the proscribed conduct but also an inherent disrespect
for law. If this is the case, this person is likely to exhibit similar
disrespect for the laws of the United States, even if the laws of
the two countries are substantively different.
An extrapolation of the accepted doctrine, which focuses on
the context of United States laws, illustrates its irrationality. If a
194. Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Constitution and the Police: Individual Rights and Law
Enforcement, 66 WAsH. U. L.Q. 11, 18 (1988).
195. State v. Ford, 499 P.2d 699, 706-07 (Ariz. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1128
(1973). •
196. Some states do not have such a requirement for out-of-state prior convictions.
See, e.g., McGirt v. State, 708 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Ark. 1986); State v. Taylor, 779 S.W.2d
636, 641 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Shannon v. State, 338 S.W.2d 462, 465 (Tex. Crim. App.
1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 935 (1961).
197. Pye, supra note 18, at 131; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.05 cmt. 1 (1962)
(noting that time and place of previous conviction carry weight in determining gravity of
offense).
198. See LAFAVE & ScOwr (2d ed.), supra note 141, at 195.
199. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3 (1990).
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United States court finds that a defendant has engaged in conduct
in a foreign country that was legal in the foreign country but is
illegal in the United States, the accepted doctrine suggests that the
court should treat this perfectly legal (within its context) conduct
as a previous crime. This result is consistent with the nationality
principle of international law, under which a country has jurisdic-
tion over the conduct of its nationals even when they are out of
the country.2' The United States, however, has not embraced
this principle;" to be consistent with this policy, American states
should view foreign convictions in the proper context, respecting
judgments regardless of the legality of the underlying conduct in
the United States.
Limits are needed, however, as to which foreign crimes may
be used to enhance sentences. The purpose of enhancing sentences
is to punish people who deserve retribution in the judgment of
American -legislatures, not to punish people who have lived under
regimes that prohibit what the United States considers protected
conduct. The standard to screen out convictions under unreason-
able foreign laws should be whether a statute using the same lan-
guage as the foreign law would survive a constitutional challenge if
enacted by an American state. This standard would leave enough
foreign laws intact to identify blameworthy international criminals
but would prevent people from receiving extra punishment if their
foreign conduct has been above reproach from an American per-
spective.2'
200. Nadelmann, supra note 14, at 41.
201. Id.
202. For example, a conviction under a foreign law proscribing newspapers critical of
the government would not be counted in a prosecution under a repeat offender statute in
the United States using this standard, because such a law would be struck as unconstitu-
tional if a state passed it. On the contrary, a conviction for assault and battery under a
foreign law criminalizing brawls among professional athletes at sporting events would be
counted. Even though the foreign conduct would not be criminal in the United States,
such a law could be enacted without violating the U.S. Constitution. Making determina-
tions of this sort might strain the resources of courts, but the qualitative analysis would




Justice Brennan criticized the imperialism of United States law
in his dissent in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, °3 noting that
the country's "three largest exports are now 'rock music, blue
jeans, and United States law.'" Legislatures and courts should
continue to look abroad, but not to export American law; rather,
they should extend the laws of other countries the respect they de-
serve by counting foreign cbnvictions as predicates to enhance
sentences when appropriate. Repeat offender statutes offer the
opportunity for legislatures and courts to promote policy goals by
expanding their often limited horizons.
203. 494 U.S. 259, 281 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting V. Rock Grundman,
The New Imperialism: The Extraterritorial Application of United States Law, 14 INT'L
LAW. 257, 257 (1980)).
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